

Congenital syphilis

Reporting on data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

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Key facts

- In 2014, 69 congenital syphilis cases were reported in 23 EU/EEA Member States, an overall rate of 2.3 cases per 100 000 live births.
- The trend for reported congenital syphilis cases has remained stable in recent years, but some countries reported small increases in reported cases compared with 2013.
- It is suspected that there is considerable underreporting: seven countries did not contribute to the reporting of congenital syphilis, and a further 13 reported zero cases in 2014.
- The low rates of congenital syphilis and decreasing rates of reported syphilis among women suggest that most Member States have programmes that aim at the elimination of congenital syphilis. Better indicator data are needed, however, to assess the effectiveness of antenatal screening programmes in all EU/EEA countries.

Methods

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In 2014, the majority of countries reported data using EU case definitions. Two countries reported that they used national case definitions; three countries did not report which case definition they used. All reporting countries have comprehensive surveillance systems for congenital syphilis (Annex). Reporting of congenital syphilis infection was compulsory in all countries except the United Kingdom. Different case definitions were reported as being used across Europe: eight countries reported using 2008 and 2012 EU case definitions, two countries reported using the 2002 EU case definition, two countries reported using other case definitions, and three countries did not specify the case definition in use.

Please note that in all analyses, cases are categorised according to the date of diagnosis.

Epidemiology

In 2014, 69 confirmed cases of congenital syphilis were reported in 10 countries. Thirteen countries reported zero cases. The majority of the cases were reported from Bulgaria (24 cases) and Poland (17 cases). The number of congenital cases reported in 2014 was comparable to 2013 (72 cases). The number of reported cases continued to decrease in Bulgaria. The number of cases increased in Portugal, Romania and Spain compared with 2013, although numbers were small (Table 1). The overall rate of reported congenital syphilis infection was 2.3 cases per 100 000 live births. This is a slight increase over 2013 despite the fact that Germany did not report data and was therefore excluded from the denominator. The highest rates were observed in Bulgaria (36 cases per 100 000) and Portugal (12.1 cases per 100 000).


Table 1. Number and rate of reported congenital syphilis cases per 100 000 live births, EU/EEA, 2010–2014

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Country	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate
Austria										
Belgium										
Bulgaria	34	45	38	53.6	29	42	27	40.6	24	35.5
Croatia					0	0	0	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	1	0.9	0	0	1	0.9	1	0.9	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.8
Estonia	1	6.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Finland										
France										
Germany	1	0.1	2	0.3	5	0.7	3	0.4		
Greece	2	1.7	3	2.8	0	0				
Hungary	1	1.1	0	0	0	0	2	2.2	1	1.1
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	1	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	13	2.3	7	1.3	5	0.9	7	1.4	1	0.2
Latvia			0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein										
Lithuania	2	6.5	0	0	1	3.3	2	6.7	1	3.3
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands										
Norway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	18	4.4	14	3.6	32	8.3	19	5.1	17	4.5
Portugal	11	10.9	10	10.3	12	13.4	5	6	10	12.1
Romania	6	2.8	10	5.1	6	3	3	1.6	7	3.8
Slovakia	1	1.7	1	1.6	0	0	0	0	1	1.8
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	5	1	4	0.9	1	0.2	3	0.7	6	1.4
Sweden	1	0.9	1	0.9	1	0.9	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	0	0	1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0
EU/EEA total	98	2.4	91	2.3	94	2.4	72	1.9	69	2.3

Source: Country reports
Legend: - = no report

Figure 1. Number of reported confirmed congenital syphilis cases per 100 000 live births; number of countries reporting congenital syphilis data, 25 EU/EEA countries, 2005–2014



Discussion

Congenital syphilis rates have been decreasing or stable in the EU/EEA since 2005. During this time, rates of syphilis among women have decreased consistently in the EU/EEA, contributing to the reduction of the risk of congenital transmission of syphilis. Data on the number of syphilis diagnoses during pregnancy are not collected routinely at a European level and it is therefore difficult to assess the efficiency of antenatal screening programmes from an EU perspective. In addition, underreporting of congenital syphilis is likely to be a problem in parts of Europe. In conjunction with its call for the elimination of congenital syphilis [1], the World Health Organization has identified four indicators to monitor programme progress:

- the proportion of women tested for syphilis at their first antenatal care visit;
- the proportion of pregnant women with a positive test for syphilis;
- antiretroviral coverage of HIV-positive pregnant women; and
- the proportion of syphilis-positive pregnant women treated for syphilis, ideally by week 24 of gestation.

These indicators allow countries to estimate programme effectiveness, defined as 'the estimated proportion of all syphilis-positive pregnant women treated by 24 weeks of gestational age' [2]. An ECDC project is currently investigating the effectiveness of national antenatal screening programmes.

Public health conclusions

Validation of the elimination of congenital syphilis in Europe is under way through efforts by the World Health Organization. Better surveillance data, including more information on the mothers of infants affected by congenital syphilis, is essential in order to understand where antenatal screening programmes are failing. The European congenital syphilis case definition is currently being updated to include still births related to syphilis infections in pregnancy. This will ensure optimal sensitivity for cases, which is essential at this stage of the elimination process.

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Annex. Surveillance systems overview

Table. Congenital syphilis, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/emerging_and_vector-borne_diseases/tick_borne_diseases/crimean_congo/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx

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Key facts

- Nine Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) cases were reported in TESSy in 2014. Five of these cases were confirmed (56%).
- CCHF is endemic in the Balkan region; Bulgaria regularly reports a small number of cases.

Methods

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• In 2014, 25 EU/EEA countries provided information on Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF). Cases were reported from Bulgaria (n=8) and the United Kingdom (n=1), the rest of the countries reported zero cases.

• Twenty countries used the [EU case definition](#), which is generic for all viral haemorrhagic fever cases, three countries used a different case definition (Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). The case definition for two countries (Belgium and France) was unknown or not specified.

Epidemiology

Four confirmed case and four probable cases of CCHF were reported in 2014 from Bulgaria. One imported confirmed case – probably acquired in Bulgaria – was reported from the United Kingdom [1]. These nine cases (one in a woman, the rest in men) were notified between June and August 2014. Five cases were in the 45–64-year-old age group.

CCHF is endemic in the Balkan region, where Bulgaria regularly reports a small number of cases (six cases in 2010, four in 2011, five in 2012, and eight in 2013).

Discussion

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever is a zoonotic tick-borne disease infecting a large variety of domestic and wild animals, but only humans present clinical symptoms. Humans can be infected by contact with blood from viraemic animals and through human-to-human transmission, in particularly during nosocomial outbreaks.

CCHF is endemic in the Balkan region and a few sporadic cases are reported on a regular basis from Bulgaria. In the WHO European Region, Turkey remains the country that is most affected. The main vector for Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, the tick *Hyalomma marginatum*, has a wide distribution in Europe [2]. Using an ecological niche modelling approach, most suitable areas for CCHF transmission in the Balkans have been identified [3].

In 2012, an imported case was diagnosed in Scotland. This fatal case had travelled by air from Kabul, Afghanistan, via Dubai to London [4]. CCHF is endemic in Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and western and south-central Asia. The septentrional limit of the main tick vector lies south of the 50th northern parallel. In Europe, cases of human infection have been reported from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Serbia, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Federation of Russia, as well as from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Public health conclusions

Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever has the potential for human-to-human transmission. Early detection of cases (clinically and in the laboratory) is essential for the implementation of protective measures and initiation of treatment [5].


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Annex

Table. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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Ebola and Marburg fevers

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Ebola and Marburg fevers. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/ebola_marburg_fevers/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx

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Key facts

- Eight confirmed cases of Ebola viral haemorrhagic fever infections were reported in EU/EEA countries in 2014. No cases of Marburg haemorrhagic fever were reported.
- 2014 was the first year that Ebola viral haemorrhagic fever infections were notified in TESSy, prompted by an outbreak in West Africa.
- Seven cases were travel related, one case was locally acquired in Spain. Three of these patients died.

Methods

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- Surveillance of Ebola was mainly conducted through epidemic intelligence activities, including the collection of extensive information on infected EU citizens.
- This report is based on information reported to TESSy and additional information available from epidemic intelligence.
- 26 EU/EEA countries reported data to TESSy in 2014.
- 18 countries use the EU case definition, four countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom) used different case definitions, and Belgium, Cyprus, Finland and France did not specify the case definition they used.
- Reporting is compulsory in 24 countries, on a voluntary basis in the United Kingdom, and 'not specified' in Cyprus. Surveillance is comprehensive ('not specified' in Cyprus) and mostly passive (22 countries, except for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the United Kingdom; 'not specified' in Cyprus) (Annex 1). Reporting is case based and done at the national level.

Epidemiology

In 2014, eight cases were reported in EU/EEA countries, five males and three females. Five cases were in the age group 25–44 years, one in the age group 45–64 years, and two patients were over 65 years old. 2014 was the first year that Ebola viral haemorrhagic fever infections were reported in TESSy.

The cases were reported by Germany (n=2), Norway (n=1) Spain (n=3) and United Kingdom (n=2). Seven of the cases were travel related, probably infected in Sierra Leone (n=5) and Liberia (n=2). One case, a woman in Spain, was locally infected (nosocomial infection). Three of these patients died.

Discussion

In March 2014, an outbreak of Zaire Ebola virus was reported in eastern Guinea. The disease spread rapidly to neighbouring countries (Sierra Leone and Liberia) and on to Nigeria and Senegal [1]. On 8 August 2014, WHO declared the Ebola epidemic in West Africa a Public Health Emergency of International Concern [2]. As of 2 December 2015, WHO reported 28 601 cases of Ebola virus disease related to the outbreak in West Africa, including 11 300 deaths. The number of cases in the most affected countries peaked in autumn 2014 and slowly decreased after that. WHO declared Sierra Leone 'Ebola-free' on 7 November 2015.

The risk of spread, regionally and globally, remains until all countries in West Africa are declared Ebola-free. However, long-term persistence of the virus in survivors may cause a number of late infections which could occur several months after a country has been declared Ebola-free [3].

Although exposure to infected wildlife animals or animal products is the usual source of infection and the start of the chain of transmission, the initial source of infection of this outbreak remains unknown.

This is the first outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa and the worst Ebola outbreak ever reported. Another unrelated outbreak, also due to Zaire Ebola virus, was reported from 26 July to 7 October 2014 in Equateur province, Democratic Republic of Congo. A total of 69 cases were reported, eight among healthcare workers. The death toll was 49 [4].

Many healthcare workers were infected while treating patients with Ebola or Marburg infection. As of 21 June 2015, 872 confirmed cases among healthcare workers were reported in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone since the start of the outbreak, 507 of these cases (58%) were fatal.

Outside of the three most-affected countries, infected healthcare workers were reported from Mali (2), Nigeria (11), Spain (1, infected while caring for an evacuated Ebola patient), UK (two, both infected in Sierra Leone), USA (two infected in Sierra Leone, two in Liberia, and two while caring for a confirmed Ebola case in a Texas hospital), and Italy (one, infected in Sierra Leone) [5].

Multiple outbreaks of Ebola virus and Marburg virus infection have been identified since their initial discovery. From 1976 to 2012, 2 387 cases of Ebola virus infections and 1 590 deaths were reported (case fatality rate [CFR] 66.6%). From 1967 to 2012, 571 cases of Marburg virus infections were reported, including 470 deaths (CFR 82.3%). Outbreaks of Ebola virus disease were reported mainly in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo, Gabon and Sudan. Outbreaks of Marburg virus disease occurred in Kenya, Uganda and Angola. In 2008, two tourists (one from the USA and one from the Netherlands) became infected after visiting, several months apart, a cave in Maramagambo forest in Uganda. One of the cases died [3,6,7].

Public health conclusions

There are currently no licensed Ebola vaccines but several potential candidate vaccines are undergoing evaluation [8].

The goal of outbreak control is to interrupt direct human-to-human transmission through the early identification and systematic isolation of cases, timely contact-tracing, proper personal protection, safely conducted burials, improved community awareness about risk factors of viral infection, and individual protective measures. Quarantine of infected patients has been shown to effectively stop the spread of the disease in previous outbreaks.

Many healthcare workers were infected while treating patients with Ebola or Marburg infection because of close contact with patients when infection control precautions were not strictly practiced or haemorrhagic viral aetiology was not recognised. Implementation of appropriate infection control measures in healthcare settings, including use of personal protective equipment, is effective in minimising the risk for transmission of filoviruses [5,9].

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
Additional information

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Annex

Table. Ebola or Marburg viral haemorrhagic fever disease, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

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ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases

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Network background and EU-IBIS reports: http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/surveillance/EU_IBD/background/Pages/Background.aspx

Annex

Table. Invasive Haemophilus influenzae disease, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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persons) and diversity in reported routes of transmission across Europe suggest that countries should continue to maintain and strengthen local prevention and control programmes to interrupt transmission and prevent further infections. Indeed, with evidence of ongoing transmission and the importation of cases to many countries, there is a clear need for countries to improve the quality of surveillance data, especially data on the country of birth and whether cases are considered to be imported, to improve the data utility. Further work is also needed to assist countries in adopting the current EU case definition to increase the standardisation of the data across countries. ECDC will continue to support Member States in this area and will develop alternative epidemiological methods to complement routine surveillance, such as seroprevalence and sentinel surveys.

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Additional information

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
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Table. Hepatitis B, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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Lassa fever

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Lassa fever. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/lassa_fever/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx

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Key facts

- In 2014, no cases of Lassa fever or other arenaviruses responsible for viral haemorrhagic fevers were reported in the EU/EEA.

Methods

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- Data were obtained from 23 EU/EEA countries.
- The EU case definition was used by 15 countries, three countries used an alternative case definition, and five countries did not specify the case definition they used.
- Surveillance is compulsory in 20 EU/EEA countries, comprehensive in 21 countries, and mostly passive (active surveillance only in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the United Kingdom) (Annex). Data reporting is case based and done at the national level.

Epidemiology

No cases of Lassa fever were reported in EU and EEA countries in 2014.

Discussion

Lassa fever is an acute viral illness that occurs in West Africa, mainly in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. A few cases were also reported in Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Benin. The viral aetiology of the disease was identified in 1969. The name refers to the town of Lassa, Nigeria, where the disease was first described. The reservoir of Lassa virus is a rodent known as the multimammate rat (*Mastomys natalensis*). Several other rodent-borne arenaviruses infecting humans (e.g. Junin, Machupo, Guanarito) circulate in South America [1].

Humans become infected through contact with the excreta of infected rodents. While about 80% of the infected people are asymptomatic, the remaining patients develop severe multi-system disease, and up to 15% of the hospitalised cases may die. Lassa fever is also associated with occasional epidemics, including nosocomial outbreaks, during which the case-fatality rate can reach 50%. Early treatment with the antiviral drug ribavirin is effective, and infection can be prevented by practising good hygiene.

Several studies estimate that between 100 000 and 300 000 Lassa fever cases with about 5 000 deaths occur each year [2]. In Nigeria, 989 cases with 36 deaths were reported in 2014; in 2013, 1 195 cases with 39 deaths were reported. In Liberia, the Ministry of Health has notified WHO of an outbreak of Lassa fever in February/March 2014 (14 laboratory-confirmed cases). In Benin, 16 cases (two confirmed, seven probable and seven suspected cases), nine of them fatal, were reported in 2014 [3,4].

The last travel-related case of Lassa fever in Europe was reported in the United Kingdom in 2009 [5]. In 2015, the US notified a fatal Lassa fever case in a traveller from Liberia to the United States. This case was the sixth known occurrence of Lassa fever in a traveller returning to the United States since 1969 [6]. In 2016, one case of Lassa fever was medically evacuated from Togo to Germany. The patient later died in a German hospital. When the corpse was prepared for flight repatriation, a staff member of the funeral home caught the disease [7].

Public health conclusions

Primary transmission of the Lassa virus from its host to humans can be prevented by avoiding contact with *Mastomys* rodents, especially in regions where outbreaks occur [2].

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Additional information

[ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases](#)

Annex

Table. Lassa fever, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Lymphogranuloma venereum

Reporting on data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Lymphogranuloma venereum. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/chlamydia/lymphogranuloma-venereum/Pages/Annual-Epidemiological-Report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- In 2014, 1 416 cases of LGV were reported in 21 countries.
- Three countries (France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) accounted for 87% of notified cases.
- Almost all cases were reported among men who have sex with men; in those cases with known HIV status, 87% were HIV positive in 2014.
- The number of cases reported in 2014 increased by 32% compared with 2013.
- A number of countries have not reported LGV cases over the years, suggesting considerable under-diagnosis and underreporting.

Methods

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In 2014, the majority of reporting countries (12) used the EU case definitions. Four countries reported using national case definitions, and five countries did not report which case definition they were using. Surveillance systems for LGV in Europe vary: 14 countries reported having comprehensive surveillance systems, but five countries operate sentinel systems which only capture LGV diagnoses from a selection of clinics (Annex).

Reporting of LGV infection is compulsory in all countries with comprehensive systems, with a few exceptions: the United Kingdom has a comprehensive system, but reporting is not compulsory; reporting is compulsory in Hungary, which has a sentinel system. Reporting is voluntary in the remainder of countries with sentinel systems.

Rates of LGV infection are not calculated because many LGV surveillance systems are not able to generate data that are considered representative of the national population. There are also significant differences in the availability of LGV diagnostics across Europe.

Epidemiology

In 2014, 21 countries provided data on the reporting of LGV cases. Eleven of these 21 countries reported a total of 1 416 cases, while the remaining 10 countries reporting zero cases (Table 1). Compared with 2013, the number of cases reported in 2014 increased by 32%. All countries except Finland, Italy and Malta reported an increase in case numbers. The largest proportional increase was reported in Ireland (sixfold) and the Czech Republic (1.5-fold).

Transmission category was reported for 889 cases in 2014 (63% of all reported cases). All but four were reported among MSM. Age was reported for all but one case, with the large majority of cases distributed evenly among 25–34-year-olds (29%), 35–44-year-olds (34%) and those aged 45 years or over (33%) (Figure 1).

In 2014, information on HIV status was available for 1 354 LGV cases (96%), of whom 54% were reported as HIV positive, 8% as HIV negative and 38% as unknown. Of cases with known HIV status, 87% were HIV positive. Between 2005 and 2014, information on HIV status was available for 4 647 cases (74% of all reported cases), of whom 65% were reported as HIV positive, 14% as HIV negative, and 21% as unknown.

Between 2005 and 2014, 6 303 cases of LGV were reported in 12 countries, with the majority of cases reported in the United Kingdom (53%; 3 367 cases), France (20%; 1 276 cases) and the Netherlands (16%; 1 023 cases). The overall increasing trend for reported cases of LGV between 2005 and 2014 is due to an increase in the number of reporting countries and an increase in case number in most of the reporting countries (Figure 2).


Table 1. Number of reported LGV cases, EU/EEA, 2010–2014

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Country	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	-	-	-	-	-
Belgium	22	21	23	48	60
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-
Croatia	-	-	0	0	0
Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Republic	1	6	9	8	20
Denmark	20	29	24	32	36
Estonia	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	3	5	7	2
France	184	191	197	327	377
Germany	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	0	0	1	2	3
Iceland	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	1	0	3	5	35
Italy	6	11	27	21	12
Latvia	0	0	0	0	0
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0
Malta	0	0	0	1	0
Netherlands	66	70	190	112	172
Norway	0	0	0	0	21
Poland	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	-
Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	428	408	402	512	678
EU/EEA total	728	739	881	1075	1416

Source: Country reports
Legend: - = no report

Figure 1. Age distribution of reported confirmed LGV cases, EU/EEA, 2014



Source: Country reports

Figure 2. Number of reported confirmed LGV cases for selected EU/EEA Member States, 2005–2014



Source: Country reports from Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.

Discussion

In 2014, the number of reported cases of LGV continued to increase in western and central European countries. The largest increases were reported from Ireland and the Czech Republic, but many other countries also reported increases. The number of reported cases is an underestimate because many countries do not routinely report LGV and the diagnosis of LGV requires confirmation through genotyping. The increase in reported cases indicates that LGV transmission continues mainly among HIV-positive MSM undertaking high-risk practices [1-3]. Different, and at times insufficient, testing strategies fail to detect a substantial number of asymptomatic cases [4].

Public health conclusions

The increasing number of cases of LGV in Europe mirror the trend for other sexually transmitted diseases, with increases predominantly due to transmission between MSM. Effective interventions need to be identified and targeted at this group of predominantly HIV-positive MSM who might have less incentive to use condoms. In addition, clinical suspicion and early diagnosis is essential in order to prevent complications. In many parts of Europe, surveillance for LGV is not well developed due to limited availability of diagnostics. Little information is therefore available on the incidence of the infection in some parts of Europe. An ECDC project will be piloting enhanced LGV surveillance in these countries in order to try to shed more light on the scope of the problem.

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Annex. Surveillance systems overview

Table 2. Lymphogranuloma venereum, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Public health conclusions

Several vaccines targeting different serogroups exist for the prevention of invasive meningococcal disease. The choice of introducing a vaccine into the routine national immunisation programme depends on the disease and vaccine attributes, as well as context-specific factors in each country, such as the disease and serogroup burden, cost-effectiveness and feasibility.

Continued strengthening of IMD surveillance is essential to evaluate the impact of ongoing immunisation programmes and to support decision-makers in view of the availability of new vaccines. Surveillance at the European level will become even more important as the incidence of the disease declines, and the pooling of data may enable the description of trends which are difficult to discern at the national level.

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Annex

Table. Invasive meningococcal disease, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Country	Year	Value
...

* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Discussion

In 2014, the notification rate of confirmed IPD was lower than in previous years and varied by country, ranging from 0.2 to 13.4 cases per 100 000 population. The variation in notification rates between countries may be due to better case ascertainment and the implementation of enhanced surveillance systems in some countries. The elderly and infants continue to be the most affected age groups.

In all age groups, the proportion of cases caused by PCV serotypes decreased, and the majority of cases were caused by non-PCV serotypes. PCV7 was first licensed in 2001 for use in infants and young children, and EU/EEA Member States began introducing the vaccine into their routine child immunisation schedules in 2006. In 2009, the higher valency PCV10 and PCV13 vaccines were licensed and have progressively replaced PCV7. To date, 25 Member States have introduced one of the conjugate vaccines into their routine national childhood immunisation programme [1].

The introduction of pneumococcal conjugate vaccines has proved to be very effective in reducing the incidence of IPD [2]. Moreover, the vaccination of infants and young children has resulted in herd protection by reducing nasopharyngeal carriage and transmission of the bacterium, contributing to a decrease in morbidity and mortality among the older age groups [3-6]. Over time, serotype replacement has gradually reduced the effectiveness of PCV7, as the rates of carriage and disease caused by non-vaccine serotypes have increased [7]. There is evidence that such increases in non-vaccine serotypes are continuing, following the introduction of PCV10 and PCV13 [5, 6]. In Europe in 2014, serotypes four and two – which belong to the five most common serotypes in infants and children aged 1–4 years – are not included in any of the currently licensed pneumococcal conjugate vaccines. Both serotypes could be potential targets for future higher valency vaccines.

Among the elderly, the majority of cases continue to be caused by PPV23 serotypes, with a third of all cases caused by PCV13 serotypes. In 2011, PCV13 was approved for use in adults aged 50 years and over. Studies have shown that PCV13 vaccination in the elderly can induce an immune response against vaccine serotypes that is non-inferior or better than PPV23. The vaccine is safe and effective in preventing non-invasive pneumococcal pneumonia and invasive pneumococcal disease [8]. However, decreases in PCV13 serotypes and increases in non-PCV13 serotypes in the elderly as an indirect effect of routine childhood vaccination may decrease the potential benefit of elderly PCV13 vaccination [9]. Further monitoring of IPD serotype trends in the elderly and post-marketing impact studies in adults are essential. Twenty Member States offer different vaccines for persons 50 years and over, and/or for risk-groups in certain age groups. Fifteen Member States offer PPV23 and nine offer PCV13 vaccination for the elderly [1].

Public health conclusions

The decision to introduce a vaccine to the routine national immunisation programme depends on context-specific factors in each country, such as the disease and serotype burden, cost-effectiveness, and feasibility. It is essential to continue to monitor circulating serotypes and antimicrobial resistance in Europe in order to assess interventions such as treatment options and the development of new vaccines.

In August 2012, ECDC has started funding SpID-net (Streptococcus pneumoniae Invasive Disease network), a project which aims to establish active surveillance of IPD in the EU/EEA in order to monitor changes in the epidemiology of IPD, estimate vaccine effectiveness of PCV vaccines, and evaluate the impact of PCV vaccination programmes. The project has study sites in ten Member States and covers around 20% of the total EU/EEA population.

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Annex

Table. Invasive pneumococcal disease, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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Poliomyelitis

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 18 December 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Poliomyelitis. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/poliomyelitis/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- The WHO European Region was declared polio-free in 2002. There was neither wild-type nor vaccine-type transmission in the WHO European Region in 2014, but the risk of importation and subsequent transmission remain high in some countries.
- The most recent polio outbreaks in what today constitutes the EU/EEA were in 2001 (three polio cases among Roma children in Bulgaria [1]) and 1992 (outbreak in the Netherlands in a religious community opposed to vaccination [2]).
- Inactivated poliovirus vaccines are used in all EU/EEA countries, except Poland where live oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) is still used for the fourth dose. Wild-type polioviruses can cause natural disease, while live attenuated polio vaccine viruses may cause vaccine-associated polio paralysis (VAPP), although the risk is very low.
- In 2014, poliomyelitis remained endemic in three countries – Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan [3].
- Imported wild-type and vaccine-type polioviruses still remain a threat to unvaccinated people in the EU/EEA. Maintaining high coverage in all population groups and continued clinical and/or environmental surveillance remain the most important tools for keeping Europe polio-free.

Methods

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- In 2014, no cases of poliomyelitis disease were reported in any of the 30 reporting EU/EEA countries. All countries reported zero cases.
- 25 out of 30 Member States report data on polio in accordance with the 2008 or 2012 EU case definition (Commission Implementing Decision 2012/506/EU of 8 August 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council).
- All Member States report data from comprehensive, passive surveillance systems with national coverage. For a summary of surveillance system characteristics, please refer to Annex 1.
- There was no report from Liechtenstein.

Epidemiology

Member States of the WHO European Region submit reports on the status of their national polio eradication programme to WHO on an annual basis [4]. The following risk factors for reintroduction and transmission after importation are assessed: health system, routine immunisation coverage, presence of high-risk groups or pockets of susceptible individuals, surveillance indicators, and existence of a preparedness plan.

On 9–10 June 2015, The European Regional Certification Committee for Poliomyelitis Eradication (RCC) reviewed the reports on the national polio eradication programme of all countries in the WHO European Region [5].

The RCC concluded, based on available evidence, that there was no wild poliovirus or vaccine-derived poliovirus transmission in the WHO European Region in 2014, but the risk of importation and subsequent transmission remains high in some countries. The RCC also identified issues that threatened the future polio-free status of the Region and proposed actions to be taken by Member States and the Regional Office for reducing the risk of polioviruses circulating in the Region.

While three Member States (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Ukraine) were considered to be at high risk of establishing substantial poliovirus transmission in the event of reintroduction, the current situation in Ukraine is of particular concern. If wild poliovirus were to be introduced into Ukraine, the RCC has no doubt that the consequence would be a significant disease outbreak, threatening the polio-free status of the European Region and presenting a significant setback to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative.

Threats description up to 15 December 2015

On 5 May 2014 [6], WHO declared the international spread of wild poliovirus in 2014 a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) following the confirmed circulation of wild poliovirus in several countries and the documented exportation of wild poliovirus to other countries. On 26 November 2015 [7], the Temporary Recommendations in relation to PHEIC were extended for another three months. WHO recently declared wild poliovirus type 2 eradicated worldwide.

Wild poliovirus transmission has been at the lowest level ever, with fewer cases reported from fewer countries than ever before. As of 15 December 2015, wild poliovirus cases were reported from only two countries in 2015: Pakistan (49 cases) and Afghanistan (17 cases), compared with 332 cases from nine countries during the same period in 2014.

Twenty-three cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) were reported to WHO in 2015, compared with 48 for the same period in 2014. The cases this year are from Madagascar (10 cases), Laos (5), Ukraine (2), Pakistan (2), Nigeria (1), Myanmar/Burma (2) and Guinea (1).

On 28 August 2015, two cases of paralytic poliomyelitis caused by circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 1 (cVDPV1) were confirmed in Ukraine [8]. The genetic similarity between the isolates indicates active transmission of cVDPV1. Both cases were from the Zakarpatskaya oblast [region] in south-western Ukraine, which borders Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. Supplementary immunisation activities were initiated in response to the outbreak.

Discussion

Europe has remained polio-free since 2002. The latest assessment by the European RCC of Poliomyelitis Eradication concludes that there was no wild poliovirus or vaccine-derived poliovirus transmission in the WHO European Region in 2014, but the risk of importation and subsequent transmission remains high in some countries.

Polio remains endemic in two countries: Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is of importance to note that there were strong efforts by countries in Africa to eradicate polio: no cases of wild poliovirus have been reported in Africa for more than twelve months, and Nigeria interrupted the endemic transmission of wild poliovirus.

The risk of importation to Europe exists as long as there is polio circulating in the world. The importation of polioviruses through faecal excretion remains a potential threat. In order to avoid cases of polio due to vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPVs), the new endgame strategy for polio eradication includes sequential oral polio vaccine withdrawal, starting with Sabin type 2 strains [9].

The September 2015 meeting of the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on immunisation (SAGE) confirmed the globally coordinated withdrawal of the type 2 component in OPV – also referred to as the ‘tOPV to bOPV switch’ – for April 2016 [10].

Public health conclusions

The risk of transmission following importation remains high in some countries, because transmission after reintroduction may occur if pockets of susceptible people exist. Vaccination coverage levels in the EU/EEA can be considered satisfactory as a whole (>90% for three doses of either IPV or OPV) and can explain the absence of WPV circulation in the region so far; however, vigilance needs to remain high. Unvaccinated pockets should be identified, and targeted actions to increase vaccination coverage in these populations should be immediately addressed. High immunisation coverage in all population groups is essential and will also provide herd immunity to still susceptible individuals.

Maintaining high vaccine coverage and continued clinical, enterovirus and environmental surveillance remain the most important tools for keeping Europe polio-free.

Additional information

[ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases](#)

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
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Annex

Table. Poliomyelitis, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Rabies

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Rabies. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/rabies/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- Three imported cases of rabies were reported in 2014.
- Every year, a small number of human cases is reported in Europe, either travel related or autochthonous.

Methods

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- Thirty EU/EEA countries reported data in TESSy in 2014.
- Twenty-four countries use the EU case definition. An alternative case definition was used by Denmark, Germany and Italy. Belgium, Finland and France did not specify their case definitions.

• Reporting is compulsory in 28 countries (not in Belgium and the United Kingdom). Surveillance is comprehensive in all reporting countries and passive in 27 countries except the Czech Republic, Slovakia and United Kingdom. Reporting is case based in 29 countries (except in Bulgaria) and conducted at the national level. Cases are mostly reported by physicians (27 countries) (Annex).

Epidemiology

Very few cases of rabies in humans are reported in the EU, and most EU Member States have not had autochthonous cases for decades. In 2011 and 2013 only one human case of rabies was reported in Europe. In 2012, two human cases were reported among European citizens. In 2014, three cases of rabies in people who travelled to a non-EU/EEA country endemic for rabies were reported: a 46-year-old woman from Spain bitten by a dog in Morocco, a 57-year-old man from France infected by a canine strain of rabies virus in Mali (Africa), and a 35-year-old Dutch woman bitten by a dog in India [1]. The case in France resulted in 158 healthcare workers potentially exposed to rabies. In 2013, one travel-associated case of rabies was reported from the Netherlands. The patient was a 51-year-old man, exposed to an unknown source in Haiti.

Discussion

Every year, human rabies claims more than 50 000 lives worldwide. It is a rare and vaccine-preventable zoonosis in Europe, but the disease is invariably fatal in infected humans once the first clinical symptoms have appeared.

Rabies is a neurological disease caused by a virus of the genus *Lyssavirus*, *Rhabdoviridae* family. The virus can infect all warm-blooded animals and is transmitted through contact with saliva from infected animals via bites, in Europe typically from foxes and stray dogs but also raccoon dogs for example. Bats are also carriers of other rhabdoviruses such as EBLV-1 (European Bat *Lyssavirus*) or EBLV-2, and can transmit rabies to other mammals including humans.

In many places in Asia and Africa, stray dogs are a main source of infections for humans. People visiting these areas should be aware of this. Illegal importation of animals is a risk for rabies. Illegally imported dogs infected with rabies virus were reported in France (2012 and 2015), Spain (2013) and the Netherlands (2013) [2] [3]. The re-emergence of rabies in northern Italy in 2008–2011 and in Greece in 2012–2013 shows the importance of maintaining high awareness levels [4]. Data on rabies surveillance in animals in Europe are available online from the WHO Collaboration Centre for Rabies Surveillance and Research [5] and from the joint ECDC/EFSa report on trends and sources of zoonoses, zoonotic agents and food-borne outbreaks [6].

Public health conclusions

It remains important to inform the public about the risk of contracting rabies if bitten by animals (especially dogs) while travelling to rabies-endemic countries or in Member States which have not eradicated the disease in their animal population [7]. Preventive measures include vaccination of domestic carnivores and oral vaccination of wildlife.

Timely prophylaxis in case of exposure to a potentially infected animal is of utmost importance, and knowledge of the epidemiological situation is vital to make decisions with regard to appropriate post-exposure measures [8]. Treatment consists of local wound care, vaccination and, if indicated, passive immunisation with immunoglobulin. To be effective, treatment has to occur as soon as possible after exposure. Every year, more than 15 million people worldwide receive a post-bite vaccination to prevent the disease. This is estimated to prevent hundreds of thousands of rabies deaths annually.

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Additional information


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Annex

Table. Rabies, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Rift Valley fever

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Rift Valley fever. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/rift_valley_fever/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx

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Key facts

- There were no cases of Rift Valley fever reported in EU/EEA countries in 2014.

Methods

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- Data were obtained from 23 EU/EEA countries.
- The EU case definition was used by 14 countries; four countries used an alternative case definition, and five countries did not provide information on case definitions.
- Surveillance is compulsory in 19 EU/EEA countries, voluntary in two (Ireland and the United Kingdom), and mostly passive (Annex 1). Data reporting is case based and done at the national level.

Epidemiology

No cases of Rift Valley fever were reported in 2014 in the EU. Between 2010 and 2014, three cases were reported in the EU. Two cases were reported in 2012 (one from France and one from the United Kingdom) who were probably infected in Comoros and Egypt, respectively. In 2013, one case – probably infected in Uganda – was reported by the United Kingdom.

Discussion

Rift Valley fever is an acute viral febrile haemorrhagic disease that affects primarily ruminants in Africa and in the Arabian Peninsula (such as cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats and camels). The disease is caused by a virus from the Phlebovirus genus of the Bunyaviridae family.

Rift Valley fever occurs in humans in many sub-Saharan countries, in Madagascar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Humans may become infected by mosquito bites and through direct or indirect contact with the blood or organs of infected animals. While most human cases are relatively mild (influenza-like illness), a small percentage of patients develops a severe form of the disease, with haemorrhagic manifestations, hepatitis and neurological disorders.

Rift Valley fever is notifiable to the World Organisation for Animal Health [1]. Animal movement may contribute to viral spread, threatening countries in the Mediterranean basin where competent vectors are present [2].

In 2014, Botswana reported an outbreak in cattle in the northern part of the country (Chobe) in July and another outbreak in August in goats in the southern region (Gaborone) [3]. In 2013, Mauritania and Senegal reported epizootics in ruminants including wild fauna [4][5].

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Table. Rift Valley fever, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Severe acute respiratory syndrome. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/SARS/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

Key facts

- Knowledge about the epidemiology and ecology of SARS coronavirus infection remains presently incomplete and the risk of re-emergence is unpredictable.
- The rapid spread of SARS worldwide showed the need to maintain surveillance despite the disease's absence since 2003.
- The emergence in 2012 of a novel coronavirus in humans in the Middle East associated with the early detection of imported cases to Europe showed that SARS and related viruses need to be globally monitored and response capacities need to be maintained.

Methods

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Epidemiology

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a respiratory disease in humans caused by the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV). In 2002–03 an epidemic originating in Foshan, Guangdong Province, China, spread globally, with over 8 000 known cases reported in eight months from 33 countries on five continents, of which 21% were healthcare workers. The case–fatality rate was about 10%. The last known community case occurred in the USA in July 2003, but another localised SARS-related crossover from animals occurred in 2004 [1].

Although surveillance has been ongoing, there were no reports of SARS virus infection in humans from 29 EU and EEA countries (no reports from Liechtenstein) in 2014; nor have there been any reports of SARS virus infection in humans worldwide since 2003.

Discussion

SARS is believed to have been an animal virus that recently crossed the species barrier to infect humans. Bats have been identified as potential reservoir hosts of coronaviruses associated with SARS [2]. The SARS outbreak illustrated the importance of sensitive detection tools in the preparedness and response to emerging health threats. Other key preparedness activities include advance planning, communication, education and training, and stockpiling supplies of personal protective equipment [3–5].

The emergence in 2012 of human cases of an acute respiratory illness of unknown origin in several countries in the Middle East (Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia with importation of several cases to Europe) revealed the importance of close monitoring, collaboration between laboratories (to promptly set up laboratory capacity for detection and characterisation of emerging pathogens), and appropriate protective biosafety measures using lessons learnt from the past SARS outbreak [6–9].

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Additional information

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Smallpox

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Smallpox. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/smallpox/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- There were no reports of smallpox or potential smallpox in EU/EEA or other countries in 2014. Smallpox was declared eradicated in 1980.

Methods

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- Data were obtained from 27 EU/EEA countries; Croatia, Portugal and Liechtenstein did not submit data.
- The EU case definition was used by 21 countries; three countries used an alternative case definition, and three countries did not specify the case definition.
- Surveillance is compulsory in 26 EU/EEA countries; surveillance systems are comprehensive and mostly passive (Annex).

Epidemiology

There were no reports of smallpox or potential smallpox in EU/EEA countries or other countries in 2014.

Discussion

Smallpox is a systemic infectious disease, unique to humans, caused by either of two orthopoxvirus variants, Variola major and Variola minor. In 1980, the World Health Organization declared smallpox eradicated.

Mass smallpox vaccination campaigns have ceased after eradication. Consequently, the population that is immunologically naïve to orthopoxviruses has increased significantly, which makes it possible to consider smallpox viruses for use as a biological weapon. Legitimately, the virus exists only in two WHO reference laboratories. Any new case of smallpox would have to be the result of accidental or deliberate release. On 1 July 2014, the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) notified an episode where employees discovered vials labeled 'variola' in an unused portion of a storage room in a Food and Drug Administration laboratory located on the NIH Bethesda campus (Maryland, USA). There is no evidence that any of the vials were breached; onsite biosafety personnel did not identify any infectious exposure risk to lab workers or the public [1].

The disease clinically and immunologically most similar to smallpox is monkeypox, a zoonosis endemic to moist forested regions in West and Central Africa. Smallpox vaccine provided protection against both infections. The observation of monkeypox cases in humans in the Democratic Republic of Congo over several years prompts the question of whether the cessation of smallpox vaccination drives this phenomenon [2,3].

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Additional information

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Annex

Table. Smallpox, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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Country	Surveillance system
Albania	Notified diseases
Andorra	Notified diseases
Austria	Notified diseases
Belgium	Notified diseases
Bulgaria	Notified diseases
Croatia	Notified diseases
Cyprus	Notified diseases
Czechia	Notified diseases
Denmark	Notified diseases
Estonia	Notified diseases
Finland	Notified diseases
France	Notified diseases
Germany	Notified diseases
Greece	Notified diseases
Guernsey	Notified diseases
Hungary	Notified diseases
Iceland	Notified diseases
Ireland	Notified diseases
Italy	Notified diseases
Latvia	Notified diseases
Lithuania	Notified diseases
Luxembourg	Notified diseases
Malta	Notified diseases
Netherlands	Notified diseases
Norway	Notified diseases
Poland	Notified diseases
Portugal	Notified diseases
Romania	Notified diseases
Slovakia	Notified diseases
Slovenia	Notified diseases
Spain	Notified diseases
Sweden	Notified diseases
Switzerland	Notified diseases
Turkey	Notified diseases
United Kingdom	Notified diseases
Wales	Notified diseases
Yemen	Notified diseases

* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

European countries, which according to the ECDC point prevalence survey reported a low proportion of SSIs in healthcare-associated infections, did not participate in SSI surveillance [1]. In addition, national representativeness and surveillance methods vary considerably from country to country, which makes it difficult to compare data across countries. Important factors influencing the percentage of SSIs are the length of the follow-up period after surgery and the differences in post-discharge surveillance methods, especially in those surgical procedures where a large proportion of SSIs are detected after hospital discharge. Inter-country comparisons should therefore use the incidence density of in-hospital SSIs, if possible.

Both percentage and incidence density of SSIs were highest in COLO operations and lowest in KPRO and LAM operations [5,6]. However, the risk of SSI differs between surgical procedure types because of the different population groups that undergo these operations and because of the different proportions of clean and contaminated operations for each operation type. Therefore, comparisons of SSI rates should be restricted to each surgical procedure type, which can then be compared across countries and years.

In 2011–2014, a statistically significant increasing trend was only observed in the percentage of SSIs in CHOL operations. There was no statistically significant trend in the incidence density of SSIs in CHOL operations, and increases were only observed in SSIs diagnosed after discharge from the hospital. It is thus possible that this trend merely reflects improvements in the post-discharge SSI surveillance in some EU/EEA countries.

The 2011–2014 surveillance data show statistically significant decreasing trends in SSIs associated with four other types of surgery. Three types of surgery also showed a decrease in the incidence density of in-hospital SSIs. The decrease in 2011–2014 in both percentage of SSIs and incidence density of in-hospital SSIs in CABG and KPRO operations suggests that the prevention of SSIs for these surgical procedures has improved, both in hospitals and during the post-discharge period.

A comparison of the 2011–2014 trends with those reported from EU/EEA countries for 2008–2011 shows a continuous downward trend in the percentage of SSIs in CSEC and KPRO operations and in the incidence density of in-hospital SSIs in COLO operations throughout the entire 2008–2014 timespan [5]. It is, however, important to note that the yearly trends in the indicators can also be affected by the different mix of hospitals that each year participate in SSI surveillance.

The percentages of SSIs in the EU/EEA associated with certain surgical procedures were in large part similar to those reported from the United States for 2006–2008, apart from the considerably higher EU/EEA rates for CHOL and COLO surgery [9]. The percentages of SSIs for CHOL operations in the EU/EEA were also higher than those reported from Turkey for 2005–2011 [10]. All participating EU/EEA countries reported higher percentages of SSIs for CHOL operations than the United States. There is no clear explanation for these differences because the data reported from the United States and Turkey include the same subgroups that are used for EU/EEA surveillance. The data on the proportion of endoscopic operations also offer no convincing explanation [9,10]. But since the average post-operative stay after CHOL operations is very short (median three days), the intensity of post-discharge surveillance could explain the higher proportions of SSIs after cholecystectomies in some EU/EEA countries.

Public health conclusions

Surveillance is one of the key components in the prevention of healthcare-associated infections and an important tool for monitoring the effectiveness of prevention and control measures [11]. In fact, surveillance of SSIs in participating EU/EEA countries may have been a factor in driving the observed improvements and decreasing trends. To further strengthen the surveillance of SSIs in Europe, ECDC will update the surveillance protocol in 2017, adding structure and process indicators for infection prevention and control. This will provide participating hospitals with an improved tool to compare their performance with similar hospitals, both nationally and internationally. These changes aim to increase the usefulness of SSI surveillance networks in EU/EEA countries and increase hospital participation across Europe.

Further efforts are needed to increase the representativeness of European SSI surveillance by extending surveillance to other EU/EEA countries. ECDC will continue to provide support to countries that want to establish or improve their national surveillance networks. In addition to the SSI protocol update, ECDC will introduce a free software package (HelicsWin.Net) for SSI surveillance and make it available to network coordination centres and hospitals in 2017. The Centre will also promote the possibility to collect SSI surveillance data for shorter periods of time in all EU/EEA countries in 2018.

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Additional information

ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases [SSI data will become available in 2017]

Annual Epidemiological Report 2014 – Targeted surveillance of surgical site infections and of infections acquired in intensive care units (pp. 17–23): <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/publications/antimicrobial-resistance-annual-epidemiological-report.pdf>

Annex

Table. Overview of national surveillance systems, 2013–2014

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- Table A2.1. Percentage of SSIs and incidence density of in-hospital SSIs after coronary artery bypass graft operations by country, EU/EEA, 2013–2014
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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Tetanus

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 7 July 2016
 Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Tetanus. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/Tetanus/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- In 2014, 84 cases of tetanus, including 48 confirmed cases, were reported to TESSy.
- The notification rate was 0.02 cases per 100 000 population, slightly lower than in previous years.
- Adults aged 65 and above were the most affected age group.
- Cases tended to occur more in warmer months when outdoor activity is higher.
- The current epidemiology of tetanus in the EU/EEA may be explained by a lack of vaccination or waning immunity in older populations.
- Due to the severity of tetanus, there is a need to maintain high vaccination coverage in all age groups and to implement catch-up/booster strategies in countries with higher rates of disease.

Methods

[Click here for a detailed description of the methods used to produce this annual report](#)

- In 2014, 26 EU/EEA Member States reported data on tetanus to TESSy; 11 of these 26 countries reported zero cases.
- All Member States except Denmark and France report data on tetanus in accordance with the 2008 or 2012 EU case definition (Commission Implementing Decision 2012/506/EU of 8 August 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council).
- The majority of Member States report data from comprehensive, passive surveillance systems with national coverage. For a summary of the surveillance system characteristics, please refer to the Annex.

Epidemiology

In 2014, 84 cases, including 48 confirmed cases, were reported by 26 EU/EEA countries. Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany and Liechtenstein did not report data.

Italy (n=35) reported 42% of all cases. The overall confirmed rate was 0.02 cases per 100 000 population. The highest rate was reported by Slovenia (0.3 cases per 100 000 population). Since 2011, there has been a decreasing trend in the notification rate in the EU/EEA.

Table 1. Reported tetanus cases: number and rate per 100 000 population, EU/EEA, 2010–2014

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
Country	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014					
	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	National data	Report type	Reported cases	Rate	ASR	Confirmed cases
Austria	-	-	0	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Belgium	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	2	0.03	4	0.05	2	0.03	1	0.01	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Croatia	-	-	-	-	1	0.02	0	0.00	Y	C	1	0.02	0.02	0
Cyprus	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Czech Republic	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Denmark	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.02	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Estonia	0	0.00	2	0.15	0	0.00	1	0.08	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Finland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
France	15	0.02	9	0.01	5	0.01	10	0.02	Y	C	4	0.01	0.01	4
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	5	0.04	11	0.10	7	0.06	5	0.05	Y	C	2	0.02	0.02	0
Hungary	0	0.00	4	0.04	5	0.05	2	0.02	Y	C	2	0.02	0.02	0
Iceland	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Ireland	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.02	1	0.02	Y	C	1	0.02	0.02	0
Italy	57	0.10	58	0.10	54	0.09	51	0.09	Y	C	35	0.06	0.05	35
Latvia	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Liechtenstein	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	2	0.06	2	0.07	2	0.07	2	0.07	Y	C	1	0.03	0.03	0
Luxembourg	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Malta	3	0.72	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Netherlands	1	0.01	6	0.04	2	0.01	1	0.01	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Norway	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.02	0	0.00	Y	C	1	0.02	0.02	1
Poland	16	0.04	14	0.04	19	0.05	14	0.04	Y	C	13	0.03	0.04	0
Portugal	3	0.03	0	0.00	3	0.03	1	0.01	Y	C	2	0.02	0.02	0
Romania	9	0.04	20	0.10	7	0.03	6	0.03	Y	C	3	0.02	0.02	3
Slovakia	0	0.00	1	0.02	0	0.00	0	0.00	Y	C	0	0.00	0.00	0
Slovenia	0	0.00	2	0.10	1	0.05	1	0.05	Y	C	6	0.29	0.28	3
Spain	8	0.02	10	0.02	8	0.02	9	0.02	Y	C	4	0.01	0.01	2
Sweden	0	0.00	3	0.03	0	0.00	3	0.03	Y	C	2	0.02	0.02	0
United Kingdom	9	0.01	3	0.00	6	0.01	7	0.01	Y	C	7	0.01	0.01	0
EU/EEA	130	0.03	149	0.04	124	0.03	116	0.03	.	C	84	0.02	0.02	48

Source: Country reports. Legend: Y = yes, N = no, C = case based, - = no report, ASR: age-standardised rate

Age and gender distribution

The most affected group was the elderly (≥ 65 years) (0.08 cases per 100 000 population), which accounted for 74% of all cases reported (n=62), followed by those aged 45–64 years (0.01 cases per 100 000 population, n=11) (Figure 1). No cases were reported in the age group 0–4 years. The male-to-female ratio was 0.6:1. Sixty percent of the cases in males (18/30) and 81% of the cases in females (44/54) were in the age group 65 years and above.

Figure 1. Reported tetanus cases, by age and gender, EU/EEA, 2014




Source: Country reports from Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Seasonality

Most cases were reported between May and September (Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2. Seasonal distribution of reported, locally acquired Tetanus cases, EU/EEA, 2014 compared with 2010–2013



Source: Country reports from Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Figure 3. Trend and number of reported tetanus cases, EU/EEA, 2010–2014



Source: Country reports from Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Outcome

Of the 46 cases with data available, 12 (n=26%) were fatal. All fatal cases were in the age group 65 years and above.

Discussion

Tetanus is a sporadic and relatively uncommon infection in EU/EEA countries, caused by the bacterium *Clostridium tetani*. Contamination of wounds with tetanus spores in unvaccinated persons can cause an illness characterised by muscular spasms and sometimes death.

The notification rate for tetanus in the EU/EEA countries remains very low, thanks to the widespread use of tetanus vaccination, which is included in the primary vaccination schedule of all EU/EEA countries [1].

The number of reported cases shows a slightly decreasing trend. Most cases were reported in the elderly, probably related to lower vaccination coverage or waning immunity in this population [2]. The peak observed during the summer months may be related to more outdoor activities during this time of year.

Despite the small number of cases, tetanus is associated with high mortality, which could be prevented by vaccination or appropriate post-exposure prophylaxis.

Public health conclusions

Due to its severity, tetanus poses a risk to unvaccinated people. There is a need to maintain high vaccination rates in all age groups and to implement catch-up/booster strategies in countries with higher rates of disease.

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Additional information

ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases

Annual Epidemiological Report 2014 – vaccine-preventable diseases: http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/_layouts/forms/Publication_DispForm.aspx?List=4f55ad51-4aed-4d32-b960-af70113dbb90&ID=1227

Annex

Table. Tetanus, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Tick-borne encephalitis

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Tick-borne encephalitis. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/tbe/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- 2 057 cases of tick-borne encephalitis were reported to TESSy in 2014, 1 986 of which were confirmed (96.5%).
- The notification rate in 2014 was 0.42 cases per 100 000 population.
- Age and gender distribution shows a clear predominance of cases in over 45-year-olds and in males.
- Most cases of tick-borne encephalitis occurred between June and October, with a peak in July.

Methods

[Click here for a detailed description of the methods used to produce this annual report](#)

- Twenty-four EU/EEA countries reported data on tick-borne encephalitis (TBE), six countries reported zero cases (Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain).
- Sixteen countries used the EU case definition, eight countries did not specify which case definition was used (Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania), and Germany used an alternative case definition.
- Nineteen reporting countries have a comprehensive surveillance system. Reporting is compulsory in 18 countries, voluntary in three (France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) and 'not specified' in three countries (Belgium, Croatia and Poland). Surveillance is mostly passive except in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the United Kingdom; the disease surveillance method is not specified for four countries (Annex 1). Data reporting is case-based (except in Croatia) and done at the national level.

Epidemiology

Tick-borne encephalitis became notifiable at the EU level in 2012. In 2014, 2 057 cases were reported to TESSy, 1 986 of which were confirmed (0.42 cases per 100 000 population). The highest rates were notified in the Baltic States. TBE was predominantly reported among males over 45 years of age. Most cases were identified between June and October.

The notification rate in 2014 was lower than in 2013 (0.62 cases per 100 000 population) and in 2012 (0.52 cases per 100 000 population) in most of the reporting countries, except in Finland, France and Norway, where the rate was stable or slightly increased. In 2014, Greece reported its first case since the start of reporting in TESSy.

The notification rate was the highest in Lithuania (12.0 cases per 100 000 population), followed by Latvia (7.4 cases per 100 000 population) and Estonia (6.2 cases per 100 000 population) (Figure 2). Slovenia showed a high notification rate in 2014 (4.9 cases per 100 000 population), but the 2014 numbers were still three times lower than in 2013 and 1.6 times lower than in 2012. As in 2013 and 2012, the highest number of confirmed cases in 2014 was seen in the Czech Republic (n=410) and Lithuania (n=353) (Table 1).

Table 1. Confirmed TBE cases: number and rate per 100 000 population, EU/EEA, 2010–2014

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Country	2012		2013		2014					
	Cases	Rate	Cases	Rate	National data	Report type	Reported cases	Confirmed cases	Rate	ASR
Austria	38	0.5	100	1.2	Y	C	81	81	1.0	0.9
Belgium	2	0.0	3	0.0	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Bulgaria	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Croatia	45	1.1	44	1.0	Y	A	23	23	0.5	0.5
Cyprus
Czech Republic	573	5.5	625	5.9	Y	C	410	410	3.9	3.9
Denmark
Estonia	178	13.4	114	8.6	Y	C	83	82	6.2	6.2
Finland	39	0.7	38	0.7	Y	C	47	47	0.9	0.8
France	1	0.0	1	0.0	Y	C	9	9	0.0	0.0
Germany	195	0.2	420	0.5	Y	C	265	265	0.3	0.3
Greece	0	0.0	0	0.0	Y	C	1	1	0.0	0.0
Hungary	42	0.4	27	0.3	Y	C	31	26	0.3	0.3
Iceland
Ireland	0	0.0	0	0.0	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Italy	.	.	0	0.0	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Latvia	72	3.5	230	11.4	Y	C	149	149	7.4	7.2
Liechtenstein
Lithuania	351	11.7	487	16.4	Y	C	353	353	12.0	11.7
Luxembourg	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Malta
Netherlands
Norway	7	0.1	6	0.1	Y	C	13	13	0.3	0.3
Poland	119	0.3	136	0.4	Y	C	195	131	0.3	0.3
Portugal
Romania	3	0.0	3	0.0	Y	C	1	1	0.0	0.0
Slovakia	31	0.6	157	2.9	Y	C	116	115	2.1	2.1
Slovenia	164	8.0	307	14.9	Y	C	100	100	4.9	4.8
Spain	0	0.0	0	0.0	Y	C	0	0	0.0	0.0
Sweden	287	3.0	209	2.2	Y	C	178	178	1.8	1.8
United Kingdom	3	0.0	0	0.0	Y	C	2	2	0.0	0.0
EU/EEA	2150	0.5	2907	0.6	.	C	2057	1986	0.4	0.4


Source: Country reports. Legend: Y = yes, N = no, C = case based, - = no report, ASR: age-standardised rate

Figure 1. Number of confirmed TBE cases, EU/EEA, 2014



Source: Country reports from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Figure 2. Confirmed TBE cases per 100 000 population, EU/EEA, 2014



Source: Country reports from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Age and gender distribution

The proportion of confirmed TBEs cases was higher in men (59.2%), with a male-to-female ratio of 1.4:1. The majority of cases belonged to the age group 45–65 years (n=802, 40.4%), regardless of gender. The rate was highest in the age group 45–64 years (0.62 cases per 100 000 population), followed by the age group over 65 years (0.42 cases per 100 000 population). The lowest rates were observed in children.

Figure 3. Confirmed TBE cases, by age and gender, EU/EEA, 2014



Source: Country reports from Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Seasonality

TBE numbers of reported cases started to increase in April, peaked in July and slowly decreased for the rest of the year, with only a small number of cases reported in December and in January (Figure 4). It is unclear if the cases reported in winter are a result of late reporting or if they refer to the day of diagnosis or the onset of symptoms. It is, however, entirely possible to be exposed to ticks – and to get bitten by them – in winter, even in northern countries.

Figure 4. Seasonal distribution of confirmed TBE cases, EU/EEA, 2014 compared with 2010–2013



Source: Country reports from Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

Enhanced surveillance in 2014

Importation status was available for 1 901 confirmed cases, 1.3% (n=25) of which were travel associated. The United Kingdom only had travel-associated cases. For 22 travel-related cases, another EU country was reported as the probable country of infection, mainly Austria (n=6) and Sweden (n=5). The country of infection was unknown for three cases.

Fourteen of 638 cases (2.2%) for which importation status was available had a history of previous immunisation (5.3% in 2013). Five were reported by Austria, five by Estonia, two by Hungary and two by Slovenia. Nine of these cases had received three vaccine doses, and three cases received four doses.

Trend

Tick-borne encephalitis became notifiable at the EU level in 2012. In 2014, the number of confirmed cases was 1 986, lower than in the previous years (2 907 in 2013 and 2 150 in 2012).

Discussion

Tick-borne encephalitis became notifiable in the EU in 2012 and is a growing public health challenge in Europe. The number of countries reporting to TESSy has increased from 19 in 2012 to 24 in 2014; this also includes countries that reported zero cases. During the 2012–2014 period, the annual number of cases reported through routine surveillance was comparable with an ECDC estimate based on an ad hoc survey conducted by ECDC [1].

Cases in people over 45 year of age and cases in males were dominant, possibly due to higher susceptibility to more serious forms of the disease in the elderly and to occupational outdoor exposure in males. Seasonality was comparable with previous surveys and showed a clear peak during the summer months [1][2]. Currently, countries with an increased risk of TBE include Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden [1,2].

Public health conclusions

People in regions where tick-borne encephalitis is endemic should be aware of the risks of exposure to ticks, protect themselves against tick bites and consider immunisation prior to exposure, which offers the most effective protection.

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
Additional information

ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases

Tick species in Europe: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/vectors/vector-maps/Pages/VBORNET-maps-tick-species.aspx>

Annex

Table. Tick-borne encephalitis, surveillance systems overview, 2014



* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.

Yellow fever

Reporting on 2014 data retrieved from TESSy* on 19 November 2015

Suggested citation: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Annual Epidemiological Report 2016 – Yellow fever. [Internet]. Stockholm: ECDC; 2016 [cited YYYY Month DD]. Available from: <http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/healthtopics/yellow-fever/Pages/Annual-epidemiological-report-2016.aspx>

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Key facts

- In 2014, no cases of yellow fever were reported in EU/EEA countries.

Methods

[Click here for a detailed description of the methods used to produce this annual report](#)

- Data were obtained from 29 EU/EEA countries, with the exception of Liechtenstein and Iceland.
- 22 countries used the EU case definition, four countries used an alternative case definition, and three countries did not specify the definition they used.
- Surveillance is compulsory in 27 EU/EEA countries, comprehensive, and mostly passive (active in Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Data reporting is case-based and at done the national level (Annex).

Epidemiology

No cases of yellow fever were reported in EU/EEA countries in 2014.

Discussion

Yellow fever is endemic in several countries in Africa and South America [1]. According to WHO, there are an estimated 200 000 cases of yellow fever, causing 30 000 deaths, worldwide each year, with 90% occurring in Africa. The yellow fever burden in Africa was estimated for the year 2013 as 130 000 cases with fever and jaundice or haemorrhage (95% CI 51 000–380 000), including 78 000 deaths (95% CI 19 000–180 000) [2].

In 2014, only 21 cases of yellow fever and 12 deaths were reported: the Democratic Republic of Congo reported two outbreaks involving seven cases, Brazil one case, and Peru reported 13 cases, including 12 deaths [3]. In 2013, 230 cases of yellow fever (including 85 deaths) were reported to WHO from four African countries (206 cases and 69 deaths, mainly from Ethiopia and Sudan, but also from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cameroon) and from two countries in South America (23 cases and 15 deaths from Peru and Colombia) [4]. Large immunisation campaigns were carried out in the affected areas [4]. However, the capacity of these countries to implement vaccination campaigns is limited due to a worldwide shortage of vaccine supplies [3].

Public health conclusions

Vaccination is the most important preventive measure against yellow fever. The vaccine is safe, affordable and highly effective, and a single dose of yellow fever vaccine is sufficient to confer sustained immunity and lifelong protection against yellow fever disease. A booster dose of yellow fever vaccine is not needed. The vaccine provides effective immunity within 30 days for 99% of the vaccinated people [1].

References

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3. Yellow fever in Africa and the Americas, 2014. *Wkly Epidemiol Rec*. 2015 Jun 26;90(26):323-34.
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Additional information

[ECDC Surveillance Atlas of Infectious Diseases](#)

Annex

Table. Yellow fever, surveillance systems overview, 2014

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* The European Surveillance System (TESSy) is a system for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data on communicable diseases. EU Member States and EEA countries contribute to the system by uploading their infectious disease surveillance data at regular intervals.